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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
from the overall luster of the book. The quality of
Blum's scholarship is very high.
In sum, Islands ofAgreementis a very useful con-
tribution to the literature on conflict management
and resolution. Blum has provided a helpful con-
ceptual framework for thinking about the differ-
ent types of agreements that develop between
long-term rivals. She argues persuasively that the
benefits of islands of agreement generally out-
weigh the costs and that most islands do not
unduly prolong conflict by making it more toler-
able. Her three case studies not only support her
argument, but also are engaging political-histori-
cal essays in their own right. It would be interest-
ing to read Blum's thoughts on the efficacy of
"islands" in other contexts- especially the
broader Arab-Israeli conflict, which one might
hope to be the topic of a future book. For now,
Islands of Agreement is good reading for anyone
interested in the geology of peacemaking.
GEOFFREY R. WATSON
The Catholic University ofAmerica
Law and the Long War: The Future ofJustice in the
Age of Terror. By Benjamin Wittes. New York:
Penguin Press, 2008. Pp. 305. Index. $25.95.
Assessing Damage, Urging Action. By the Eminent
Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism
and Human Rights. Geneva: International
Commission of Jurists, 2009. Pp. 199. At
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf.
Two timely and powerful works effectively
frame the legal and political debates about con-
temporary counterterrorism strategy, particularly
in the United States. Read together, they also raise
the most essential questions about the nature of
the threats to peace and security. Benjamin Wittes
has written the energetic and thought-provoking
Law and the Long War. And a panel of Eminent
Jurists of the International Commission of Jurists
(Panel) has produced a substantial and hard-hit-
ting report that assesses the damage done in the
conduct of the so-called war on terror. Like
and a massive flow of civilians from south Lebanon to
the north, Hezbollah was still able to fire Katyusha rock-
ets into its northern territory." Should there be an
"after" before "a massive flow"?
Wittes, the Panel focuses on the suitability of the
legal architecture for responding to the threats
posed by transnational terrorist networks. While
Wittes argues that the Bush administration's pol-
icies failed mostly for domestic political reasons,
the Panel concludes that they were bound to fail,
based as they were on a misguided belief that the
scale and scope of the terrorist threat was unprec-
edented and demanded significant deviations
from the rule-of-law system upon which states
have long relied for their security. For the Panel,
the conduct of a "war on terror" itself constitutes
one of the gravest threats ever posed to the inter-
national legal system.
Although not trained as a lawyer, Wittes is a
longtime observer of the U.S. legal system who has
written an important and insightful study of the
"war on terror." A senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution and formerly an editorial writer for the
Washington Post, Wittes writes widely on contro-
versial legal affairs. In previous books he proposed
eliminating live confirmation hearings for federal
judges and praised the conduct of Kenneth Starr's
investigation ofPresident Bill Clinton. In Law and
the Long War, Wittes has turned his lively intellect
to analyze the ways that the United States should
investigate, detain, interrogate, and try accused
terrorists in the "Age of Terror." Finding the
efforts to date deficient, Wittes proposes a new
"kind of constitution for the war on terrorism" (p.
145). In framing his argument, Wittes embraces
the Bush administration's characterizations about
the revolutionary nature and scope of the terrorist
threat, while rejecting some of its means for
addressing that threat.
Wittes stakes out a position as a serious "conse-
quentialist." Because it underlies his methodol-
ogy, the philosophy of this "consequentialist"
approach calls out for a more explicit definition. I
take it to mean that the merits of actions should
be evaluated in light of, or at least not without
regard to, their immediate consequences. In its
robust form, this approach reads like a variation of
Hobbes's philosophy that the ends of national
security justify virtually any means that are reason-
ably tailored to the necessity. In its watered-down
form, it may mean merely that policies should not
be formulated, nor actions taken (or foresworn),
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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
without regard to the gravity of their conse-
quences. Bright lines leave policymakers insuffi-
cient space in which to maneuver.
To establish this position, Wittes treads a nar-
row, sometimes winding path between positions
taken by the Bush administration and those of
human rights advocates, civil libertarians, and the
detainees' lawyers. For instance, because it might
have prevented the outrageously effective attacks
of 9/11, warrantless wiretapping of U.S. persons is
both necessary and ethically defensible: the "gov-
ernment should have relatively easy access to tele-
communications and other data, the mining of
which has an essential role to play in combating
terrorism and other transnational threats" (p.
224). We simply need Congress to provide
enabling legislation that includes a few safeguards
to ensure that the information is not abused.
Wittes may well be correct about the need for
access, but he provides little evidence in support of
his position. As this reviewer sees the situation, the
intelligence community had access to information
sufficient to thwart the 9/11 attacks, and to the
extent its members believed that they were unable
to share or use that information, laws have been
revised. Wittes rests his argument on a "thought
experiment[:] ask yourself whether a year after the
next horrific attack, anyone will still be arguing
against [a warrantless wiretapping program]," and
he sees the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 as "represent[ing] an approach that captured
the zeitgeist of its moment-but it is a moment in
which many Americans no longer live" (p. 228).
This thought experiment embodies my princi-
pal concern about the book. It postulates a threat
of unprecedented scope and scale, one capable of
completely overwhelming the existing security
apparatus and society's own capacity for resilience.
Working from the assumption that his character-
ization of the threat is accurate, Wittes identifies
significant gaps in the government's legal author-
ity to collect potentially useful information, and
he proposes remedies and protective measures that
appear entirely sensible. But is his axiom correct?
Does the terrorist threat necessitate a revolution in
the nation's constitutional order?
Among the consequences of counterterrorism
policy that Wittes seems not to contemplate are
the secondary effects of U.S. policy and practices
upon the rest of the world. While accepting that a
successful response to Al Qaeda requires a "long
war" and a new body of law, Wittes fails to address
the unintended consequences of these innova-
tions. His new architecture would create a civil sys-
tem of preventive detention that suspends the pre-
sumption of innocence and much due process. In
his view, opposition to this measure is "almost cer-
tainly delusional" (p. 158). He would eliminate
judicial review of government actions that affect
aliens abroad, accept the moral costs of extraordi-
nary renditions, and legitimate torture itself. He
explains that we are building "a constitution for
the war on terrorism" (p. 145). This structure
would stand separate from ordinary law and the
law of war to "avoid seepage of legal doctrines
devised for terrorism into domains that already
have coherent bodies of law of their own" (p. 146).
Wittes expands on this hopeful distinction: "we
don't want the nastiness we may sometimes toler-
ate in interrogations in this conflict to become
acceptable treatment for American service mem-
bers caught by foreign nations under the laws of
war" (pp. 146-47). If only nonmilitary intelli-
gence operatives torture, then the Geneva Con-
ventions continue to protect soldiers. In short,
Wittes shares with prominent members of the
Bush administration an inability or unwillingness
to account for the unintended, but inevitable, con-
sequences of establishing a regime that employs
"nastiness."
As others have noted, and contrary to the overall
thrust of Wittes's argument, America's influence
and consequently its interests are dramatically
undermined by the widely held perception that it
acts unilaterally, imperiously, or just hypocriti-
cally. Instead of acting in ways that would isolate
Al Qaeda, the United States' disregard for interna-
tional law and institutions has drawn recruits,
sympathizers, and funds for the extremist groups.
Moreover, unilateralism undermines the univer-
sality of hard-won rule-of-law norms that contrib-
ute so significantly to the fragile process of civili-
zation. Wittes overlooks the distinct possibility
that the long war-or even a clash of civiliza-
tions-might become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As the Panel notes, these adverse consequences
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
have taken a considerable toll on human rights and
on other critical objectives and interests around
the world.
In some ways, LawandtheLong Warhas already
been overtaken by events. One good illustration
concerns the election of Barack Obama, who ran
on a platform of change and a promise to close
Guantinamo. Obama dropped the phrases
"unlawful enemy combatants" and "war on ter-
ror," and started to bring terrorist suspects to trial
in federal district court.1 These changes have
surely altered the terms of the debate within Amer-
ica and the world, though they have not therefore
mooted the purpose and point ofLawandtheLong
War. The fight against terrorism may yet prove to
be a long one, and Wittes's conceptualization, pol-
icy concerns, and strategic choices may yet prove
to be an essential part of the fight. But if these
issues prove to be mostly the products of the faulty
understanding and missteps of the Bush adminis-
tration, then the book's utility will be short-lived.
Only time will tell.
The case of Boumediene v. Bush2 provides
another good illustration of events outpacing the
analysis in Law and the Long War. Lakhdar Bou-
mediene was a Guantinamo Bay detainee who
argued that Congress lacked the capacity to deny
his constitutional right to habeas corpus. Wittes's
book went to press after the Supreme Court heard
oral arguments but before it issued its decision rec-
ognizing Boumediene's constitutional right and
rejecting some of Wittes's arguments about the
rights of security detainees and the role of courts in
determining those rights. Nevertheless, as a long-
time and well-informed court watcher, Wittes
offers some trenchant observations about the sep-
aration of powers in the formation of national
security policy. He clearly explains the limitations
of policymaking by judges. Typically, they have
no expertise in intelligence, national security, mil-
itary affairs, or policymaking. They generally can-
not choose the cases that come before them or
when. Their access to information is, as a practical
' Mark R. Shulman, The "War on Terror" Is Over-
Now What? Restoring the Four Freedoms as a Foundation
for Peace and Security, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L & POL'Y 263
(2009).
2 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
matter, limited to what the parties present. And
traditional judicial canons force judges to narrow
their decisions in ways that may treat parties fairly
but create ill-considered systems. 3 Because of these
constraints, Wittes would keep these cases out of
the courts. Although he recognizes some of the
failures of the Bush administration, as well as the
constitutional problems inherent in its efforts to
formulate policy insulated from the other
branches, Wittes blames Congress for failing to
step in to establish more legitimate and effective
policies. He claims that
in the war on terrorism, Congress has done
very nearly the opposite of countering the
executive's rather considerable ambitions. It
has run from its own powers on questions on
which its assertion of rightful authority
would be helpful, and it has sloughed off the
difficult choices onto the two branches less
capable than itself of designing new systems
for novel problems. (P. 11)
Notwithstanding Wittes's suggestion that it
was not assertive enough, in reality Congress has
been remarkably active over the past eight years
(albeit largely in line with the legislative agenda of
the Bush administration). Within the first few
years following 9/11, it issued the sweeping
Authorization for the Use of Military Force and
took the unprecedented step of pre-authorizing
war against Iraq. In order to detain and interro-
gate those in U.S. custody, Congress curtailed
the due process protections of immigrants and
passed the Detainee Treatment Act and then the
Military Commissions Act, delegating to the pres-
ident virtually every constitutionally permissible
power (and then some, it has been argued). In
order to permit gathering intelligence from people
not in custody, it revised the Foreign Intelligence
3 Owen Fiss, The Perils ofMinimalism, THEORETI-
CAL INQUIRIES IN L., no. 2, 2008, Art. 13 (2008)
(showing "how minimalism has led to legislative enact-
ments that deprive the prisoners of basic rights and that,
as a practical matter, compromise the capacity of the
Supreme Court ever to adequately address the [detain-
ees'] claims."); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, The
Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. (2009) (review essay of Law andthe Long
War, taking a critical view of Wittes's narrative of the
role of the courts in shaping U.S. counterterrorism pol-
icies).
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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
Surveillance Act of 1978, gave amnesty to tele-
communications companies that had complied
with extralegal orders to provide information, and
passed the USA PATRIOT Act that tore down bar-
riers to intelligence sharing among agencies. It has
also passed numerous laws to tackle terrorist
financing and authorized in excess of a trillion dol-
lars to make America safe. From this record, one
might well conclude not that Congress has been
shirking its duties, but that it is responding as it
sees fit and in accordance with the requirements of
the Constitution and the democratic process.
Moreover, and as Wittes acknowledges, had Pres-
ident Bush escaped the constraints imposed by his
unitary executive theory, he might well have
requested and received even more tools from Con-
gress.
When Wittes complains about congressional
inactivity or judicial hyperactivity, his actual com-
plaint, though not stated in these terms, is that our
eighteenth-century Constitution is unfit for meet-
ing the terrorist threat. That Constitution has sur-
vived, however, for over two centuries, during
which the nation has faced an astonishing range of
threats. Arguably, the Civil War posed the greatest
threat to the Union. Thirteen states seceded. The
war killed more Americans than all other wars
combined. In the face of this truly unprecedented
threat to the nation's security, the Supreme Court
concluded the 1866 case of Ex parte Milligan as
follows:
The Constitution of the United States is a
law for rulers and people, equally in war and
in peace, and covers with the shield of its pro-
tection all classes of men, at all times and
under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences,
was ever invented by the wit ofman than that
any of its provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government.
Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or
despotism, but the theory of necessity on
which it is based is false; for the government,
within the Constitution, has all the powers
granted to it, which are necessary to preserve
its existence; as has been happily proved by
the result of the great effort to throw off its
just authority.4
4 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 120-21.
Significantly, the Civil War experience gave the
nation no reason to trim back civil rights. Con-
gress used the occasion, instead, to expand them
by passing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments.
When we turn to Assessing Damage, Urging
Action, it is immediately apparent that the Emi-
nent Jurists see the world in a much different way
than Wittes. Much like the Radical Republicans
who dominated Congress in the 1860s, the Panel
sees the recognition of human dignity as the key to
security, progress, and prosperity. Chaired by
former South African Chief Justice Arthur
Chaskalson, who had in 1963 served on Nelson
Mandela's defense team, the Panel included
diverse judges, lawyers, and academics with first-
class credentials in human rights and humanitar-
ian affairs: Georges Abi-Saab (Egypt), Robert
Goldman (United States), Hina Jilani (Pakistan),
Vitit Muntarbhorn (Thailand), Mary Robinson
(Ireland), Stefan Trechsel (Switzerland), and Rafil
Zaffaroni (Argentina). Other than Robinson, who
served with distinction as president of Ireland,
none appears to have significant military or exec-
utive experience. The International Commission
of Jurists secretariat staff supported the Panel,
which launched its global study in 2005. Panel
members and staff convened public and private
hearings on every continent, collecting first-hand
information on experiences with counterterrorism
campaigns over the past forty years. They met
publicly with leaders of the bench and bar, human
rights activists, academics, and other members of
the public. Privately, they met with a wide swath
ofgovernment officials. While the particular focus
was the ongoing campaigns against Al Qaeda and
its affiliates, the Panel took in a great deal ofinfor-
mation about earlier counterterrorism campaigns
around the world. Culling through many thou-
sands of pages of notes and records (many posted
now on the commission's Web site), the staff
drafted while Panel members commented and
edited. Notwithstanding this cumbersome pro-
cess, the resulting report offers a pellucid assault
on the concept and strategy of the so-called war on
terror. Steeped in the historical record and
unafraid of veering into political issues, the Panel
2009]
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
takes as its basic tenet that "any implied dichot-
omy between securing people's rights and people's
security is wrong. Upholding human rights is not
a matter of being 'soft' on terrorism" (p. 16). The
report concludes: "It is time for change" (p. 25).
The Panel's conclusions are readily summa-
rized. While flatly rejecting the concept of a "war
on terror," they acknowledge that terrorism poses
serious threats and that states must strive to
counter it. But since 9/11, states have demon-
strated a worrying propensity to discard hard-won
legal institutions that had previously done much
to ensure security. By deviating from ordinary
criminal law and undermining international law,
these states are acting in gravely counterproduc-
tive ways. They fail to employ the most powerful
tools for addressing terrorist threats, and they
undermine their own legitimacy-in effect, feed-
ing the discontent that nourishes terrorism. More-
over, the historical record reveals a trend that con-
solidating power in the executive leads to abuses
having nothing to do with the counterterrorism
agenda.
The Panel rejects the notion that states need
new legal paradigms or tools in order to counter
the threat of transnational terrorist networks.
Most of the "change" that the Panel intends to
effect is, as one might therefore expect, a return to
the pre-9/ 11 norms of international and domestic
law. In short, the rule of law remains the most
effective counterterrorism tool; derogations from
it produce seriously adverse consequences. They
undermine the overall effectiveness of the rule-of-
law system and feed cycles of hatred and violence.
Although written without reference to Law and
the Long War, the Panel's report frequently seems
like an effort to refute the premises upon which
Wittes wrote and the policies that he seeks to pro-
mote. The Panel focuses on the cyclical dynamics
of violence and brutality. In contrast, Wittes
implies that the consequences of violence can be
wholly beneficial and fully contained. His book
opens with a chilling story intended to shock the
reader out of his smug "nonconsequentialism." In
the months following the close of World War II,
British soldiers searched in vain for Rudolf Hoss,
the one-time commandant of Auschwitz. In due
course, they located his wife, who refused to pro-
vide information about his location. To compel
her to give up her husband, the British threatened
to render their son to the Soviet Union. Forced to
choose between the lives of her husband and her
son, Frau H6ss capitulated. Her husband was
quickly captured, and after serving as a witness at
Nuremberg, he was tried by the Polish govern-
ment and hanged on gallows specially constructed
on the ground of the former concentration camp
that he had commanded.
For Wittes, the suffering that Frau H6ss expe-
rienced during this interrogation was outweighed
by the benefit that society received through the
capture of her husband. For this reviewer, the
Hbss incident raises a number of other consider-
ations, including: how to weigh the value of infor-
mation; the definition of cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment; the roles of noncombatants;
and the mechanics of transitional justice. It also
brings into sharp focus the contrast between tech-
nical expediency and due process, between captur-
ing a heinous criminal and abiding by the stan-
dards of civilization. In the long run, is civilization
better off allowing some mass murderers to escape,
recognizing that such is the price of maintaining a
robust system of the rule of law? From Wittes's
perspective, what matters is that H6ss served as a
valuable witness at Nuremberg and was then exe-
cuted; Frau H6ss's ordeal-as engineered and car-
ried out by British military personnel-was no
more than the collateral effect of a process that
achieved a worthy objective. Wittes writes that he
thanks God that the British soldiers had been will-
ing to subject Frau Hoss to this ordeal (p. 3). His
gratitude glosses over the kind of effects that trou-
ble the Panel. What happened to Frau Hss, the
British soldiers, their families, and their commu-
nities? What effect did this kind of action have on
the development of a postwar system of justice?
What signals did it send (and continue to send
through his retelling) about who we are and who
we should be? Moreover, by focusing attention on
one event in which the desired outcome was
achieved (the capture and execution of the villain),
are we missing one or possibly many stories about
other wives who were mistreated in vain, either
because they would not reveal their husbands'
whereabouts or because they had been telling the
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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
truth all along? What about the documented inci-
dents of innocent people being tortured to death
or of torture actually hindering the gathering of
intelligence? Wittes does not address these kinds
of questions. Instead, he encourages the reader to
wonder whether there might be other instances
when a measure of brutality would make the world
a much better place.
The Panel, unlike Wittes, addresses these kinds
of questions by examining the systemic effects of
counterterrorism regimes from recent history,
focusing mainly on the experiences of Northern
Ireland, Argentina, and Peru. The Panel observes
that Great Britain's efforts to suppress political
extremism in Northern Ireland succeeded only
when it suspended its own role in perpetuating the
cycle of violence. London abandoned "failed
detention policies" that had driven hundreds of
young men into forming a highly efficient insur-
gency force, and it abandoned the special purpose
Diplock Courts and restored a legal system with all
the protections of due process and substantive
criminal law. This course correction enabled Lon-
don to halt processes that were corrupting the
British rule of law and to start an authentic peace
process for Northern Ireland. During the late
twentieth century, states across South America
and South Asia had to learn similar, equally pain-
ful lessons. Many had themselves been feeding ter-
ror through their own brutal policies.
Eight years after 9/11, the legal framework for
responding to the threat of transnational terrorism
remains hotly contested. With their contending
visions, these two works-Wittes's Law and the
Long War and the Panel's Assessing Damage,
Urging Action-outline the terms of this vital
debate. Both are thoroughly researched, thought-
fully reasoned, and fearlessly argued. And as of this
writing, it is unclear which vision will prevail.
MARK R. SHULMAN
Pace University School ofLaw
Targeted Killing in International Law. By Nils
Melzer. Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008. Pp. liv, 468. Index. $130, £65,
cloth; $60, £29.99, paper.
Few international law topics evoke such a vis-
ceral response as "targeted killings." The attention
paid them is somewhat curious since attacks must
actually be "targeted" if they are to comply with
the international humanitarian law (IHL). Article
51.4 of Additional Protocol I of 1977' expressly
provides that "indiscriminate attacks are prohib-
ited," explaining that they include those "which
are not directed at a military objective ... and con-
sequently ... are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction." The United States, inter alia, is not a
party to Additional Protocol I. However, the Cus-
tomary International Humanitarian Law study of
the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) correctly asserts in Rules 11 and 12 that an
analogous prohibition exists in customary law for
both international and noninternational armed
conflicts.2 Human rights norms, binding in cer-
tain circumstances of armed conflict and generally
applicable in the absence thereof, are equally
demanding. There is no question that an attack
that is not targeted violates international law.
The crux of the matter is, instead, who it is that
is targeted and in what circumstances. During
armed conflict, the rules are, at least textually,
straightforward. Article 48 ofAdditional Protocol
I, which applies in international armed conflict,
requires belligerents to "at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants
... and accordingly ... direct their operations
only against military objectives." This broad
restatement of the customary law principle of dis-
tinction is operationalized in Article 5 1: "The
civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be the object of attack." How-
ever, the Protocol cautions that civilians lose this
protection from attack "for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities." Common Article 3 to
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions similarly for-
bids, in "conflicts not of an international charac-
ter," acts of "violence to life and person" directed
at "persons taking no active part in hostilities"-a
l Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 12,1977,1125 UNTS 3, reprinted in 16ILM
1391 (1977).
2 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW 37-43 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
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